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BOOK REVIEW
EUROPE AND THE DOLLAR: By CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER.'
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1968. Pp. 297. $3.95.
The complex, nebulous, esoteric subject of the international monetary
system is appearing ever more frequently in the headlines of our daily
newspapers. Discussions of the price of gold, the balance of payments,
and the relative strengths of the dollar, pound, mark and franc are no
longer relegated to the board rooms of New York banks and American
corporate giants or to the offices of the Treasury Department and the
Federal Reserve System in Washington. Even the man-in-the-street
will offer you his views on these difficult problems. The story circulat-

ing among economists, which is told not entirely in jest, is that there
are two men in the world who fully understand the structure and
operations of the international monetary system. They 'are both vizened, old, grey-headed men who wear 40 Years of -Faithful Service
pins and the green visor of the lowly clerk. One sits in the -subbasement of the Treasury in Washington; the other sits in 'a cold, damp,
dark office of the Exchequer in London. They know the system. The
problem is that they disagree.
Three times since November 1967, the world has been treated to
the spectre of a major crisis threatening its monetary system. And
three times, officials of the world's major monetary powers have man-

aged to agree upon a set of measures to preserve the system. The first
crisis, in November 1967, involved speculation against the British pound
and culminated in the devaluation of that currency. The second crisis
followed in the spring of 1968 and threatened the value of all the
world's major currencies as speculators and citizenry alike moved out
of paper money and into gold. That crisis was resolved by a decision
to isolate transactions in official monetary gold from those in privately
held nonmonetary gold. The third crisis was precipitated by a mas-

sive flight out of the French franc into other currencies, primarily the
German mark, in November 1968. This also threatened the perennially
weak pound. Belt-tightening measures by France and the United Kingdom and import tax and export rebate adjustments by Germany were

put into effect to end this crisis.
1. Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,..
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Professor Kindleberger's book provides background information of
varied analytical depth which is of value in attempting to understand
the international monetary system and the long-term origins of the
most recent crises. In this volume, he has gathered together 17 papers
and memoranda. which he wrote in the period 1939-1965 dealing with
international monetary relations among the developed countries. The
book is not intended to be a complete treatise on the subject. Professor Kindleberger states in the preface that he collected these papers
for publication since they had not previously appeared in routine
scholarly channels and would otherwise probably have been lost to
the public.2 The chapters are arranged chronologically, by date of
writing, rather than by subject matter. This arrangement is interesting
for the insight it gives into this eminent economist's changing analytical
response to the rapidly moving economic developments of this 26year period. However, it does present problems to the reader whose
knowledge of international economics is limited. In fact, the reader
whose knowledge is limited might best be advised not to attempt most
of the papers, presented in the book until he has developed a basic
acquaintance with the discipline.
Since the end of World War II, one of the most interesting developments on the world monetary scene has been the shift in the position
and relative strength of the dollar, to which Professor Kindleberger
devotes several chapters. In the immediate postwar period there was a
great shortage of dollars in the world as the war-ravaged countries
turned to the U.S. to supply their consumption and investment needs.
With an intact productive capacity and unprecedented gold reserves
standing behind the dollar, it assumed the primary position among the
world's currencies. Dollars were actively sought by foreigners both to
pay for imports from the U.S. and to add to the reserves backing up
their own national currencies. From 1950 onward, with occasional
interruptions, the U.S. ran a balance of payments deficit. This very
deficit is what allowed the Europeans to add to their holdings of dollars. Suddenly, in 1958 and 1959, the average annual U.S. deficit more
than doubled from the averages of the 1950 to 1956 period.' In 1958,
the U.S. began losing gold as foreigners for the first time since the
war turned in dollar holdings to make net purchases of gold. They
thereby indicated they would no longer hold unlimited amounts of
2. C.

KINDLBERGER, EUROPE AND THE DOLLAR, Vii (1966).

3. Id. at 138.
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dollars. This marked the end of the dollar shortage and the beginning
of the dollar glut, as it is called. U. S. officialdom was forced to turn
its attention to the causes of the persistent balance of payments deficit and to seek measures to restore equilibrium.
In a paper written early in 1960, Professor Kindleberger turned his
attention to causes of and cures for the disequilibrium.4 There was a
tendency in this period to blame the balance of payments deficit on
inflationary disequilibrium. It was thought that inflation in the U.S.
was pricing U.S. goods out of their competitive position in the world
market. Professor Kindleberger marshals impressive evidence against
this conclusion, although he does admit that the evidence does not
absolutely disprove the allegation. 5 He focuses rather upon a structural disequilibrium as the more important cause of the U.S. deficit and
cites five structural changes since 1953 to which the U.S. balance of
payments had not adjusted by 1960' and to which, in fact, it has
probably not yet adequately adjusted itself. The first two are an increasing supply of U.S. imports and of competing exports in other
markets, both of which resulted from the success of U.S. policies in
aiding the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan and from "a
rapid closing of the technological gap which previously separated these
countries from the U.S." Many would argue that the technological
gap has once again become a yawning chasm in the course of the
1960's, even though it was closing in the 1950's. However, the U.S.
continues to be faced with increasing competition in its own domestic
and in other markets from the efficient industrial plant which it helped
create in Western Europe and Japan after the war. The other three
structural changes involve what Professor Kindleberger has appropriately called "this country lifting the horizon of its economic vision
more completely to the world level." These three changes--are as follows: (1) "an increased demand in the U.S. for imports from Western
Europe and Japan, especially of consumers' goods which are differentiated from U.S. products;" (2) "an increased awareness of and interest
in the possibilities of producing goods abroad at costs below those in
the U.S., with a resulting expansion of direct investment" by the
U.S. abroad; and, (3) "increased awareness of and interest in foreign securities." These factors may still be looked upon as contributing
very basically to the U.S. balance of payments deficit.
4. Id., Chapter Nine.
5. Id. at 138-44.
6. Id. at 145-46.
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In the most recent essay included in the book, written in 1965,
Professor Kindleberger retains his belief in the basic soundness of the
U.S. dollar. He was not, even at that late date, overly concerned about
measures to cure the disequilibrium and probably feared more than
anything else, as he expressed it in earlier essays, that the U.S. would
take measures to restrict either trade or capital flows, which might be
a cure worse than the disease. In Chapter One, Professor Kindleberger
argues for, a more appropriate definition of a balance of payments
equilibrium. Non-economists should be made to realize the subjective
and arbitrary nature of the equilibrium definitions used by economists
in discussing: the balance of payments. As Professor Kindleberger says,
.. . it is- important that subjective appraisals discard the terrifying
definitions we have allowed to creep into the discussion, and recognize
the fact. Objective circumstances of strength can be turned into chaos
by subjective judgments." 7 The problem here is analogous to the two
little old men who know the international monetary system, but disagree. The objective strength of the dollar defined by one economist
is seen by another as a mere subjective judgment. But one thing is
certain. In an international monetary system which relies so heavily
for its existence upon continued worldwide confidence in the stability
and strength of the dollar, it is the subjective judgments of the traders, investors, and speculators which can make or break the system.
Therefore, it is of little help to the dollar if the U.S. official definition
of balance of payments equilibrium overstates the weakness or understates the strength of the dollar and thereby falsely molds the subjective
judgment of dollar-holders around the world.
In this collection, Professor Kindleberger devotes equal time to the
events in the recent economic history of Europe and to the characteristics of the European economy which have affected international monetary relations. In a paper written in 1963, he discusses an interesting
phenomenon related to the European capital market which occurred
in the 1950's and early 19601s.8 Because of the general underdevelopment of the European capital market and the lack of financial integration in Western Europe, it became commonplace for Europeans to
float their bond issues in the New York market and also for European
investors to purchase a large portion of these bond issues. It was his
thesis at that time that no single financial center for long-term capital
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id., Chapter Five.
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would develop on the Continent, but that the well-developed, broad
New York market would serve this function for Europe. If it hadn't
been for the U.S. Interest Equalization Tax and for the more recent
voluntary and then mandatory controls on outflows of investment
capital from the U.S., this development would probably have continued. While European national capital markets remain relatively
underdeveloped today, European corporations and American corporations operating in Europe are resorting ever more frequently to
the Euro-dollar market and to floating bond issues denominated in dollars to fulfill their long-term capital requirements. So European financial
integration may occur after all by means of the U. S. dollar.
In another very interesting chapter, Professor Kindleberger turns
his attention to the role of international corporations in European economic integration.0 It is his thesis that economic integration cannot be
achieved merely by eliminating barriers to the flow of goods and
services across national boundaries. Economic integration also implies
the free movement of factors of production across boundaries. The
Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community
in 1958, provides for such free movement. While labor has moved
rather freely between some regions of the Community, this has been
much less the case with capital. Professor Kindleberger argues that
organized markets for goods, services, labor, and capital may not prove
adequate to achieve complete integration, and he cites the role of the
national corporation in the economic integration of the U.S. Such a
corporation borrowed money where it was cheapest, probably in New
York, and invested that money where it could put labor and materials
together in least-cost combinations, relative to market outlets."0 This
tended to cause equalization of factor prices and thus integration of
the American economy. The American corporation has seen fit to
enter the European Community, establish operations where this leastcost combination is attainable, and reap the benefits of a large, affluent
market with reduced, and now eliminated, barriers to trade within
that market. And all this has been done with little or no regard to national political boundaries. On the other hand, European corporations
have tended to retain their narrowly nationalist outlook and continue
to produce only in their home countries. The absence of a unified. body
of European corporate law has impeded the establishment of interna9. Id., Chapter Two.
10. Id. at 29.
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tional operations by European corporations. However, once such a
body of law is established, the mind of the European business executive will have to be shaken loose from its traditional, conservative
patterns of thought before the European corporation may play its
rightful role in the integration process.
As stated at the outset of this review, Professor Kindleberger's book
provides valuable information on the international monetary system and
on the long-term origins of the recent crises. However, because of the
form in which it is presented, that is, a collection of papers and memoranda, and because of the considerable analytical depth characterizing
most of the essays, the audience appeal of the book is rather limited
to those with a vocation, or at least a serious avocation, in economics.
Europe and the Dollar is definitely not "Everyman's Guide" to international financial relations among developed countries.
BYRon
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